TLDR
In this episode, Jason speaks with Michael, founder of Euler Protocol, about how
Euler bounced back from a major hack to reach $1B in TVL. Michael explains how
their modular lending architecture, curator-led markets, and capital efficiency
attract both major assets and long-tail markets. They discuss Euler’s
liquidation system that minimizes penalties, their rehypothecation model, and
how vaults boost yields for both lenders and borrowers.
Euler is now expanding cross-chain and preparing to launch two new products:
EulerSwap, a novel DEX that turns lending accounts into just-in-time liquidity
providers; and Euler Earn, an aggregator vault system similar to Metamorpho but
with broader access. While revenue is not the top priority, the team expects
both products to significantly boost usage, lending demand, and consequently its
TVL and take-rate, potentially ultimately driving Euler token buybacks and
sustainable protocol growth.
CHAPTERS
00:30 Introduction to Euler Protocol and Its Journey
03:22 Technology and Liquidity: Key Drivers of Growth
06:28 Capital Efficiency and Liquidation Mechanisms
09:31 Market Flexibility and Customization for Curators
12:15 Future Growth Strategies and Cross-Chain Expansion
15:37 Incentives and Revenue Generation in Euler
18:28 Funding and Financial Sustainability of Euler
33:36 Funding Operations and Token Management
38:36 Introducing Euler Swap: A New DEX
53:44 Euler Earn: Asset Management Innovations
TRANSCRIPT
<Jason Kam (00:00)>:
I don't expect this to be ridiculous. Probably got a couple of people on, GM,
we're live. Today is April 15th, 5 PM Hong Kong time. BidCast is being live
streamed to BidClub members. Questions are from members and my own. Welcome to
our episode of BidCast. Today we're speaking with Michael, the founder of Euler
Protocol. Michael, welcome.
<Michael (00:08)>:
GM.
<Michael (00:30)>:
Thank you very much for having me on. Yeah, it's great to be here.
<Jason Kam (00:33)>:
Yeah, yeah. I mean, after all the crap that was thrown at you, mean, you guys
are up to a billion dollar TVL now. Why don't you tell us about things like, how
did you come from a debt from, you know, you know, hacked and then now to a
billion, what drove that growth? Tell us more about that.
<Michael (00:41)>:
Yeah.
<Michael (00:52)>:
I mean, yeah, it's been incredible. I'm just absolutely delighted that we've
been able to pull it back like this. We had high expectations, but maybe not
this high, this quick. I think there's been a lot of different factors. Firstly,
we'll get into probably at some point what we've built. I think it's
fundamentally extremely good technology that's superior to competing technology
in a variety of ways.
<Michael (01:21)>:
Technology alone isn't, isn't good enough. Sometimes you can build a 10 or 20 %
better product. And if you don't have everything else in place, then that's not
enough to, to overcome competition. I think like particularly liquidity is king
in this, in these markets for a lot of different protocols. And so even if
you've got 20 % better product, if somebody else has got the liquidity and you
don't, then they can't use your 20 % better product. Right. So overcoming that
challenge has been tough. Think Euler's model naturally lends itself to.
to kind of growing liquidity because it uses this curator model, which is
similar to some of the competition, Where rather than just build, have the
Euler-Dao or Euler-Dao associates build a lending protocol, we have different
risk curators that come in and build their own products in their own image. And
they bring with them their own networks and their own contacts and their own
reasons for growing these markets, many of which we're totally unaware of,
right? So like some people ask me.
<Michael (02:18)>:
Why is it going so well on the X, Y, Z network? Or why is this market so big?
And sometimes we just have no idea. I mean, the Resolve market, for instance,
was one big driver in the early days. It's sort of slowed a little bit recently,
but still doing quite well on Euler. But that was one, one market that went
extremely well. It was curated by a team called Apostro. They knew the, they
knew the resolve team. They knew.
The fundamentals of that project seem very strong. Honestly, they knew a lot
more about it than we did and that market really, really grew quite quickly on
Euler. So that's just one example, one really nice example of something that
took off and that's not because of us in a way. You know, we built the
technology and facilitated it but we didn't directly have a massive hand in it.
would say it's all down to Resolve themselves and Apostro for knowing that team
and bringing it on board.
<Jason Kam (03:10)>:
And you would say that most of the TVL just happens organically, like you didn't
do BD or anything.
<Michael (03:15)>:
Well, I mean, we have, yeah, we have one BD person at Euler who works extremely
hard, who knows everybody, you know, he goes around and talks. So I wouldn't say
we don't, it's not like we don't do BD, but yeah, a lot of projects, I'm sure
everybody knows that a lot of projects start by going out. They have, maybe
don't even have a live token yet and they'll secure, you know, some kind of
headline figure TVL, which then comes in through some kind of private, private
deal. And Euler hasn't had the liberty of doing that, right? Because we had a
liquid slash liquid.
token after after everything that happened and you know I think at the time we
relaunched the fully diluted valuation of that was just was pretty much on the
floor so it's not like we had the option to go out and offer somebody you know
silly money to go out and bring TVL so in the end yeah we did some another
driver was we decided to say well there are people who still believe in Euler
there's a lot of uncertainty around the project can we pull it back so we
decided to do a locked Euler
reward campaign and that has been a big driver. So that uses public incentives
where we essentially sort of wrap the Euler token up into a linearly vesting
wrapper and then we distribute that. So I think that's been an important driver,
especially to help new markets where there's a bit of a chicken and egg problem
emerge and grow spontaneously. If you look at the dollar value of the public
incentives we've done, it's still less than three million since launch year.
<Jason Kam (04:39)>:
It's not that much. It's not that much. And so most of the teams that onboarded
you through the curation model, they basically thought, we need to create the
market here. And this is just about the only solution in WIFI 2 that allows us
to build or do what we want to do. And that's why we're building. Is that
roughly the right line of idea?
<Michael (05:02)>:
I think so, yeah. I mean, you can't just add any old asset to something like an
RV and establish lending and market, right? It's tricky, but a lot of new assets
out there do need utility in lending facilities. So the other option is to kind
of go with an isolated model that has been tried many times. It's partially the
way that things work on things like Morpho, but it's often inefficient. And on
Euler, the...
protocol itself is just way more flexible than any of the protocols out there.
So you can build more efficient capital markets on Euler than you can elsewhere.
And so oftentimes that's one of the main reasons why people come to Euler is
that there's just things they can do on Euler that they can't do elsewhere. And
that's, yeah, so a lot of these new assets, been a massive proliferation, now,
stable coins recently and things like that, that are seeking credit markets.
<Michael (05:58)>:
to help themselves grow and so they come to Euler to build. Yeah.
At least as far as I understood it, the mechanism of V2 and your coding and
design mainly benefited your collateral and lending in two ways. One of which is
that your liquidation mechanism is a bit more advanced, which allows you to push
the collateral requirement to be lower than your competition. And the other one
is that
Because of this hybrid model that you offered, the folks that deposit the assets
are able to accrue slightly higher yield versus an isolated model, for example.
Is there any way you can quantify for us? Well, first of all, am I missing
anything aside from those two things? And then secondly, can you quantify for us
what that really means for, let's say, a $100 deposit into your platform? How
would it translate to like,
some more additional yield or additional benefits to the depositor or borrower.
<Michael (07:05)>:
Yeah, sure. I did say they probably are the two key sort of capital efficiency
drivers. And one of the things, you know, just to say upfront, what that means
is when you're more capital efficient you don't have to spend and heavily
bootstrap like others have done. Yes, but others have had to spend tens of
millions of dollars in incentives to grow these markets. But if you have natural
drivers of efficiency, then you can grow faster organically. So let's say the
liquidation model first. I mean,
<Michael (07:34)>:
borrowers on lending protocols sometimes get liquidated. And on other markets,
they typically pay essentially a penalty on their collateral when they get
liquidated. That penalty essentially provides the incentive for the liquidator
to provide the liquidation service to perform the liquidation. If you have a
very big penalty, then there's a very big incentive. If you have a small
penalty, then there's a smaller incentive. the penalty is always a percentage of
the collateral.
And so actually that doesn't really make sense, right? If I'm liquidating a
hundred million dollar position, then a 5 % penalty could be absolutely
enormous, both for the liquidated party, but also for the person, the incentive
is just massive. $5 million for liquidating this position. It's just way more
than any bot runner needs. These are all just bots willing these liquidations,
right? So why do we need a 5 million penalty? It's insane. But 5 % on a hundred
dollar position, you know, we're now talking $5.
Is that even enough to pay the gas cost of liquidation? Possibly not, right? So
the point is that the percentage penalty, the percentage penalties don't really
make sense. What there is is like a fixed cost of liquidation. And then after
that, there should be a kind of auction that runs to determine how much
incentive you need to liquidate somebody. And that's essentially what Euler
does. has this Dutch auction that's based on something called the health score
of a borrower. And what it means is that large borrowers get liquidated at very
low percentages.
percentage penalties. I posted about this on Twitter recently, know, some of
the, I think, off the top of my head, I think the penalties way less than half a
percent if you've got, you know, if you're borrowing tens of thousands of
dollars, which is at least an order of magnitude better than if you get
liquidated on something like Morpho or AAVE In some cases, we were two orders of
magnitude lower on the penalties charged, you know, if you're borrowing millions
of dollars, then
You definitely want to get liquidated. you are going to get liquidated, you'd
much better off getting liquidated on Euler than on other platforms. So yeah, so
just better for borrowers, I would say in that regard. But it also means things
are better for lenders as well, by the way. You people often miss this. If
you're taking someone's collateral and handing it, taking it out of the system
to the, you know, to the MEV bots that run these liquidations, that means
they're less collateralized than they were before, which means you push the
system closer towards
<Michael (09:57)>:
insolvency than it previously was, right? So it's not just better for borrowers,
good efficient liquidations are better for everybody in the system. And Euler
has, in my opinion, the best in the business. I've posted about this many times.
<Jason Kam (10:07)>:
Yeah. And since that is the case, are you able to push the leverage that a
borrower can undertake so they have higher efficiency?
<Michael (10:16)>:
I think so. I mean we often get asked about this. Most of Euler's markets are
relatively conservative on LTVs. I would say, and I'll explain why that is in a
second as well when come to the next point you raise. I think if you were to run
isolated markets like they have on more flow flowed, you could really push those
LTVs much, much higher. But we tend not to have too many isolated markets on
Euler even though it's possible to create them.
Euler is very flexible in that regard. You can replicate more for all fluid type
markets on Euler very easily, but most most curators tend not to build those
markets. And the reason reason for that actually leads into the next point,
which is what, why, why are things more efficient in terms of the, the class
usage on Euler? It's because on Euler, you can essentially our primitive unit is
a single vault and a single vault can be either used for lending and borrowing,
or it can be used for as collateral or both.
And so when you use it as both and you have effectively rehypothecation on the
markets, that means you're earning interest whilst you're using something as
collateral at the same time. That's exactly how things work on Aave. So you
deposit ETH in Aave to borrow USDC, possibly to go long ETH. God forbid anyone
does that anymore. You will often earn interest on the ETH you've deposited from
somebody else who's actually borrowing that ETH, possibly to go long on.
liquid staking token yield or whatever else, right? So that makes the cost of
borrowing lower. So you going long ETH on something like Aave, then it does on
something like Morpho. If you were to go long ETH versus USDC on Morpho, your
ETH would be just locked in earning no yield. It would essentially be what's
called escrowed and held in a vault, not earning anything. But on Euler and on
Aave, the collateral often earns users extra yield.
And so that, that extra yield makes the whole system more efficient. means that
there's, you know, you don't have to, grow it, to grow a market like an ETH long
position. You don't have to, you don't have to subsidize it as heavily with
rewards. You know, I was looking recently and they just aren't, there's nobody
going long ETH on, on more for on mainnet for example. I think there are markets
on base like that, but there just isn't on, on mainnet. And I think it's cause
it would be very expensive to bootstrap a market like that perhaps or.
<Michael (12:45)>:
Yeah, it's just a very different value proposition than it is on Aave or on many
of the markets on Euler. So rehypothecation obviously comes with additional risk
as well. I should emphasize that. It's not a free lunch by any stretch, but in
many cases, a lot of markets, it does make sense to have a degree of
rehypothecation and many curators want that. And then those markets tend to grow
faster and liquidity tends to be stickier in those markets because the capital
is just used more efficiently.
<Jason Kam (13:15)>:
And the yield generated on a collateral is certainly higher than a Morpho, but
is most of the time not higher than that of Aave, assuming a similar level of
utilization for borrowing.
<Michael (13:29)>:
on Euler, it tends to be a little higher than AAVE at the moment. I think AAVE I
mean, it depends on the market conditions. would say. Frankly, AAVE is, is kind
of underutilized at the moment. You know, there's the, the market's gone more
risk off. You've seen the interest interest rates on AAVE have dropped below,
you know, on, on, on dollars, they've dropped below, even the T bill yield,
which is kind of insane that you, you earn less on AAVE than on, on T bills. So
it depends heavily, but there's no reason why they should be any less.
<Jason Kam (13:32)>:
Mm-. Mm-.
<Jason Kam (13:44)>:
I see.
<Michael (13:59)>:
the yield should be any less on Euler markets than it should on AAVE. It really
depends how the vault curators configured their markets. Some opt for more
conservative parameters, some opt for more risk-on parameters, and which give
higher yields. as always, there's no risk without reward, and it's up to the
vault curators and the people who use those markets to determine, know, it's up
to the market essentially to determine what people want. It's not a constraint
of the technology in Euler like it...
<Jason Kam (14:13)>:
I see.
<Michael (14:28)>:
perhaps is on other products. It's a constraint imposed by the risk curator and
then by the market itself on what it wants.
<Jason Kam (14:38)>:
. So for anybody who is like borrowing, instance, they are, it would seem like
their collateral would earn well, they earn a higher yield and collateral at the
moment thanks to high realization because AAVE given a sheer size is potentially
reutilized. And then their liquidation, they will feel a little safer in cases
of like extreme market conditions. And that plus the flexibility that it's
offered to curators is what you would say.
basically helps you get from standing start to a billion today.
<Michael (15:12)>:
I think so. mean, and that and the ability to heavily customize the markets, you
can just build things on order that can't be built elsewhere because of the
underlying flexibility of the technology. we built in this, you know, we say
it's sort of the modular lending protocol, because what we did was we abstracted
all the core properties of lending markets into discrete modules, which then the
curators themselves can compose and build back together markets in their image.
If you look at Aave, it's very opinionated.
a very opinionated product, but on the more complex, more capital efficient side
of things. If you look at Morpho, it's kind of on the other extreme. It's very
opinionated, but it's on the simplicity side of things. Well, Euler isn't
neither, right? It allows you to build either simple markets or more complex
ones. And there are just all sorts of more advanced features that you can add.
are advanced access controls for risk-curators to play with if they want more
security or risk management control.
<Michael (16:08)>:
There are, you know, hooks for complaints and, and like, you know, trade,
changing the way that markets work. One of the big markets on Euler was built by
the Usual team. And it was the, it was, Euler was the only place in town that
they could build this usual stability loan that they've got, right. They
couldn't build it anywhere else. And so they built it on Euler using some of the
more advanced, you know, features that the Euler vault kit provides them, that
they can't get on, on another, on other,
<Michael (16:38)>:
Yeah, protocols
<Jason Kam (16:39)>:
Yeah. There's about 30 billion of TVL on Aave and then maybe five billion on
Morpho. You're at a billion and the compound for Robert is pretty checked out
building super state. like there's maybe like 40 billion up for grabs. How do
you get from one billion to five billion? Like what are you building and what
are you working on to get you there?
<Michael (17:04)>:
I so there's a few things coming down the line. mean, firstly, I think it's
important to go to where users are and there are different types of users across
DeFi, different networks. Euler's been moving cross chain quite rapidly to
different networks and meeting users where they are. yeah, that helps for
multiple reasons, not just because there's TVL on those networks, but it means
that a user that possibly uses one or two of those networks gets more familiar
with Euler across.
across that. So you might, you might pick up a user that really enjoys using
Euler on base for instance, and that's also a user of mainnet. And so they now,
they might not have found your mainnet. They might have been an Aave user on
mainnet, but they find you on base and now decide to, you know, so you pick up
loyal customers and sticky TVL that way, I think. So it's important to go, go
across network and yeah, we're launching on BNB today in fact, but we've had
several other big chain launches over the past few months.
<Jason Kam (17:58)>:
Nice.
<Michael (18:03)>:
So that's one part of things. I think consistent growth and just lendy is really
important. There's nothing better than just proving over time that things are
secure. I mean, obviously all is like perhaps the most audited protocol in DeFi
or close, it's right up there at least. But yeah, nothing beats lendy being
live. I think AAVE proves that right.
<Michael (18:33)>:
AAVE V3 has been around for a long time. It's had its own issues in the past,
but it's now been robust for quite a long time, I would say. And so people trust
it for that reason. Just being, being secure and safe for a long period of time
is really important. You see, you know, you mentioned Compound, they've been,
they've kind of been checked out. think there's some, some efforts to recover
their growth from the DAO from within the DAO, think, but as a
<Michael (19:00)>:
They've probably been lacking leadership for some time, but their TVL is quite
high because ultimately it's an old protocol at this point and it has that lendy
and has that trust, I think. And then the other thing I would say is, you know,
it's no secret that Euler has been building a dex for some time. And so we're
excited to launch that in the near future. That's actually going into audit at
the moment. yeah, it's already had several really good audits come back and...
<Jason Kam (19:09)>:
.
<Jason Kam (19:22)>:
Okay.
<Michael (19:27)>:
Yeah, we'll hopefully have an announcement out about that in the very near
future. But I think that's important because the way that the debt works will
naturally drive more volume through the Euler lending market. It's not some
separate product. You people ask why have we built this thing? It's not
disconnected from Euler at all. It's in fact heavily dependent on it and a core
part of the main Euler lending protocol. And that will increase capital
efficiency even further.
<Jason Kam (20:00)>:
We'll be sure to talk about it. But it seems like it's more so about going on
different chains at the moment and letting the long tail enablement do its own
work. But you're not actively introducing incentives or, is that fair to say?
<Michael (20:19)>:
It's not that we don't have incentives. I mean we definitely do every new chain
deployment. We typically do a hundred thousand dollars of Euler incentives in
this, this reward or token as a minimum and see, then, and then I think the
incentives tend to be quite dynamic. So we see, you know, what works, what
doesn't, what assets come on board. Sometimes there's incentive matching.
depends on, what kind of proposals come through the DAO
<Michael (20:46)>:
So they definitely are part of it. It's not like we don't have incentives. Yeah,
a lot of people come to Euler for those. Yeah, I think new networks are quite an
important part of it. I mean there isn't that... I'm not a person that thinks
that Euler should be on 100 networks or anything daft. I think there are
probably going to be a handful that succeed over the...
<Michael (21:11)>:
over the next few years, I think we will, we've had this big proliferation and
now we will probably consolidate on networks that can specialize and offer users
something, a unique experience. So it's hard to predict ahead of time, which
those networks will be in my opinion, you know, there are lots of great builders
out there and it won't necessarily be the best builders that end up winning of
course. So it's really hard to say, but I think, yeah, it's important that
Euler's on those early. think if you,
<Michael (21:40)>:
If you try to grow somewhere a bit later, it's often much harder than it is if
you're kind of a first mover on those networks. So yeah, that's definitely a key
part of things.
<Jason Kam (21:45)>:
down.
<Jason Kam (21:48)>:
So being all chains, like BSC and BASE, and then there are more L2s launching,
would you be compatible with the faster ones, like MONAD and MegaETH and those
higher throughput ones, eventually?
<Michael (22:05)>:
Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. I mean, I expect things, the defocus systems there will
be, will be a little different, I suspect, because of the things you can do once
you have that, once the latencies, you know, change by orders of magnitude, that
kind of changes the way that things like MEV work and so on. So I think there
will be, there will be differences, but it shouldn't, shouldn't affect the value
proposition of overclassed, Icelandic and boring, in my opinion. I think it's
more, more likely to impact Dex's. Yeah.
<Jason Kam (22:07)>:
Okay.
<Jason Kam (22:18)>:
Mmm.
<Jason Kam (22:30)>:
Yeah. And just to understand, yeah, we're going to talk about the majors for a
second, because I'll be pretty curious on how you incentivize the TVL there to
grow. But it would seem like you really narrow it into a niche, which is none of
the new launches of new tokens would get on Aave, because it's a common pool. if
those collateral rug, everybody kind of there gets hurt. So it's a very rigorous
process.
But at the same time, doesn't seem like Morpho is flexible enough. It doesn't
offer you a lean collateral And it doesn't sort of, it's this almost curated
process. even opening a pool there takes a bit of effort. And the tech there may
not support this kind of flexibility. So you're kind of the only game in town
when a new protocol, this kind of long tail needs to offer bar lending markets.
And is that the right way? And that's why you're gaining this share so rapidly.
Is that the right way to think about it?
Because you sort of hit on a market. Yeah, yeah. I wonder where else they could
go.
<Michael (23:27)>:
Yeah, think that's partly true. mean, some of the Euler is biggest markets are
in majors though. It's not like it's just a sea of sort long tail projects. I
would say there's actually more long tail markets on Morpho perhaps than there
is on Euler. So Euler has...
<Michael (23:52)>:
It has a kind of, you know, often when people curate the market, they recreate
something that's a bit like an Aave and inevitably that tends to consist of
major type assets. So yeah, we have two DAO control markets that are governed by
Gautner and Objective, two risk curators on Euler and they're governed by the
DAO much like, you know, Aave has its model with Chaos and Llama Risk and
others.
<Michael (24:22)>:
And yeah, they're very much consistent majors of premium tier blue chip assets,
I would say. yeah, it's not just long tail. would say there's probably less long
tail, really long tail than there is on Morpho where they have these ungoverned.
Ultimately, most curators on Euler tend to retain governance control. On Morpho,
there's obviously the lower level markets, the Morpho blue markets are.
<Michael (24:50)>:
of all ungoverned, they're sort of permissionless. And that brings with it its
own unique risks and reputational risks. When people build and curate markets in
order, they have the option to deploy those ungoverned, isolated pairs, but most
of them prefer to, it seems to us, prefer to create their own governed markets
where they have greater control, access controls, and an ability to, for
instance, pause a market or take action in the event that the...
<Michael (25:19)>:
know, interest rate model needs changing or the economic environment shifts and
so on. And so when you govern markets, you tend to, I think they tend to, those
curators tend to take on board more reputational challenges, right? And so they
don't necessarily want to go out and just deploy markets for absolutely
anything. And so the really long tail stuff, I think is still, not really on
order, I would say.
<Jason Kam (25:33)>:
Yeah.
<Jason Kam (25:44)>:
. Do you have any plans to incentivize the quality on majors, like BTC and all
the other major coins, or is that not a priority?
<Michael (25:55)>:
We have done that. mean, on Euler Prime, which is the kind of DAO government
market I mentioned, there's incentives on liquidity there on things like on some
of the major Bitcoin mappers, CbBTC, we've done CbETH, USDC, Tether incentives
and so on. So some of the majors have definitely been incentivized on that kind
of Euler Prime based market and on other networks as well.
<Jason Kam (26:10)>:
.
<Michael (26:24)>:
You know, we've got a big market on base, for example. Yeah, the thing I would
say is that incentives, you know, if you're a shiny new project and you've got
some low float high FDV coin to distribute, you can kind of incentivize USDC
markets. You can maybe grow 100 million USDC market just by distributing tokens.
Euler hasn't had that. if it can't like, there's only so much you can
incentivize a hundred million dollar USDC market or 200 million dollar market,
right? You, you if you want to boost the APY by five, five percent, let's say,
and you want to get a $200 million market, you're looking at $10 million in
incentives alone. Well, that's three times the total amount of incentives, more
than three times the total amount of incentives we've done in, you know, however
long, seven, seven months now, whatever it's been.
<Michael (27:22)>:
across every single network, across every single market, right? So it just
wouldn't be sustainable for Euler to grow massive markets using incentives
alone. It's just not feasible. But what we do do is find that they're successful
using incentives in the first few months of a new market. When a market is born,
people need a reason to deposit. If there's no depositors, there's no...
<Michael (27:51)>:
people can't borrow and so on. you can, you can actually, I think incentivize
deposits of USDC up to maybe a five or 10 million or maybe even 20 million sort
of size, just using incentives alone. And then that gives the opportunity to
kind of see like seeds, the market gives the opportunity to grow organically
from there. If it can't find a reason to grow organically from that 10, $20
million starting point by itself, then is it really worth bootstrapping and
paying for anyway? I would say probably not.
<Michael (28:21)>:
There might be some cases where it needs to get bigger before it's more useful,
but yeah, that's generally the philosophy, I think, for us and our strategy for
growing things with incentives.
<Jason Kam (28:30)>:
So that's not the major plan at the moment. Okay. just off the math, usually
it's a spread model that you clip a fee and the sort of bar and lending that
occurs, especially on the borrowing and there's a tick rate. On a billion TVL,
is it roughly $3,000 to $4,000 a day and roughly like a million dollars a year
of revenue to the protocol? Is that roughly right?
<Michael (28:33)>:
We couldn't even do it if we wanted to. Yeah, so no. I mean, yeah.
<Michael (28:58)>:
Um, I think, , I think it's a little higher. Um, it depends on the, it depends
on the fees. So yeah, the, the, way that the fees are set on order is, , it's
essentially the, the, curator chooses the fee. Whatever fee they choose, they, ,
the protocol gets half. So they set a 10 % fee, 5 % of that will go to their,
you know, half of it will go to the curator half that will come back to the
protocol. Um,
<Michael (29:26)>:
Some curators set higher fees on some of the markets, so that I've seen fees as
high as 15 or 20 % on some markets. So obviously all we get 10 % there and it
depends what the interest rates are. So some of the interest rates are way
higher than a 5%, right? When Ethena was yielding crazy amounts, it was much,
higher. So yeah, I think what we've seen is it's probably closer to two and a
half million.
<Jason Kam (29:36)>:
huh.
<Jason Kam (29:45)>:
Yeah.
<Michael (29:55)>:
revenue across the billion TVL annualized yeah and then the thing to say as well
is that on the Euler-Derivative markets which are some of the biggest markets on
Euler there's obviously no there's no there's no curator to pay there however
much like Morpho which is obviously has a fee switch turned off at the moment
they would take 10 % on all their markets if they turn their fee switch on
<Michael (30:22)>:
Our strategy essentially was to turn the fee switch on for anything that's long
tail, just by default. So the fees were already being charged today and the
revenue's coming in. So Euler's already generating more revenue than Morpho
today. You know, it's probably on track to generate several million dollars, I
think, over the course of a year already, but it's switched off for the majors.
And that's because just like Morpho, we're trying to grow and it makes sense to
subsidize the growth. You know, you could either do that with token incentives,
which we've discussed a very...
<Michael (30:52)>:
hard for a little bit, but rather than do it with incentives, then you just say,
well, we'll take no fee on USDC or Tether or WETH or like, know, Wrapped
Bitcoin, or cbBTC. So some of the majors just are just completely switched off
to kind of incentivize growth.
<Jason Kam (31:01)>:
Yeah.
<Jason Kam (31:07)>:
And that fee is auctioned, and you can bid on those fees based on with Euler.
that's how if, and that sort of Euler that gets bid sort of get burned, I'm
guessing. That's how you sort of execute it. Okay. Makes sense.
<Michael (31:20)>:
Yeah, so the, yeah, they exactly. So fees, no matter what, what currency they
would get bought in on a kind of auctioned off using this module called fee
flow. And the way you buy the way you bid on the fees is through, through Euler
tokens. if someone, someone auctions, let's say if there's a $5,000 auction,
then typically around $5,000 of Euler token will be sent in to bid and purchase
that. It's obviously there's a little spread there because people want to
profit. So.
<Michael (31:47)>:
Yeah, it's a heavily bought option at this point, I would say, though, and we
tend to see it's quite efficient. So, yeah.
<Jason Kam (31:52)>:
. And how is the team funded at the moment? Like you raised dollars
historically, I'm guessing that's still a run rate that you're burning through
and you can sell tokens to fund your operation.
<Michael (32:03)>:
Yeah, it's we have we have I think we're a runway if we take takes it if there's
zero revenue, zero sales or anything. Obviously none of that would be true. I
think is currently takes us to at least the end of December next year, 2026. I
suspect that might be a little might be pushing into 2027. And yeah, most of the
most of the funding we
<Jason Kam (32:21)>:
Mm. Yeah.
<Jason Kam (32:29)>:
huh.
<Michael (32:32)>:
We've raised three rounds of funding, right? Historically, our last funding
round was back in 2022. That was led by Horn Ventures. Before that, we had a
Series A with Paradigm in 2021. And before that, a Seed round with Lemnis Gap.
Yeah.
<Jason Kam (32:35)>:
Uh-huh.
<Jason Kam (32:50)>:
Yep. But sorry, just so I'm aware, all the fees being generated by Euler and
protocol gets auctioned and then directly goes to burn. So allegedly, the equity
box should have no revenue going into it.
.
<Michael (33:06)>:
I see, yeah, I mean, some of the fees don't go into auction. For instance, the
ones on the usual stability loan don't go into auction, so they could be used to
fund protocol operations. it's governed and it depends on the individual market.
But yeah, most of them currently are, the ones that are being generated
currently are being used to buy back the token. So in principle, if that were
the case forever, you know, in every market, then indeed you would have a model
where...
you bought back the token and then you would effectively sell the tokens in
order to fund operations. That's how the DAO would have to operate. So I don't
think there's a free lunch there. You either have to, you either take the fees
and use those directly to fund operations or you take the fees and then sell
tokens to fund operations. think it's, yeah.
<Jason Kam (33:54)>:
Yeah, and roughly off that two to three, how much is directed towards buyback
versus going to the equity?
<Michael (34:01)>:
Currently, when you say equity, mean...
<Jason Kam (34:04)>:
I mean going directly towards paying the team and salaries and whatnot.
<Michael (34:07)>:
Hey, and the team. Well, at the moment, think, yeah, I think essentially all of
it would have to, you know, if we, we assume that it was all just coming, there
was no buyback, right? It would, yeah, I think our, burn rate means that we
would, yeah, we wouldn't be profitable at the moment at the current, current
situation. I think we had a
A DAO proposal recently, there was requesting somewhere between five and seven
million for another year of operations. So that's how much we cost. That's
inclusive of absolutely everything. it's all, it's the cost of Gauntlet and
Objective, all the audits, all the legal, like it's absolutely everything
associated with the project. It's probably a
<Jason Kam (34:51)>:
So there's a treasury got it. there's a treasury basically and then the two to
three million dollar goes in but you're requesting five to seven million a year
that is going out. So how much go so how much goes towards to burn?
<Michael (35:00)>:
Exactly.
Well, right now the tokens go when they're in the fee flow auction that's
happening right now, I think that basically the tokens aren't being burned.
They're just deposited back in the treasury. So the DAO can choose what it wants
to do with those tokens. They could be burned. If the DAO votes for it, I mean,
we could just switch that on and just burn whatever's been accumulated today if
it wanted. Alternatively, there's some...
<Michael (35:32)>:
alternative views on this, right? mean, one view is that you would just burn it.
Another view is that you can kind of buy back and redistribute. One thing I
would say is that when rewards are distributed on Euler through this reward
Euler contract, anybody that breaks vesting, they can break vesting at any point
and they can claim what's due to them through vesting at that point. But any
remainder,
the term that it's a six month term basically and any remainder that's not
claimed is then burnt. So there is some token being burnt at the moment through
early claimants essentially. I'm not sure. think, yeah, last I checked is about
$150,000 have already been burned through just early claimants essentially just
unlocking. But that's the only real burn that's happening today unless the DAO
votes to burn some of the buybacks that are being brought back in.
<Jason Kam (36:25)>:
Right. And just to be very clear, when you say there's $2 $3 million of revenue
from the fees being generated based on the tick rate of the curators, not all of
that is burned. In fact, goes into a treasury which you have claims to. And you
do propose DAO proposals so that those fees actually go to you to company the
equity.
<Michael (36:46)>:
Yeah, to well, not just to us, but to all service providers, right? Yeah. But
yeah, yeah. So right now, yeah. So clearly right now we're not the project isn't
profitable yet. It's not too far away, but like, if you just look at the amount
out versus the amount in, there's probably still a two to three million dollar
gap there that needs filling. So Euler is still needs to grow. And once it grows
a bit more or it cuts costs a little, let's say, then it would become
profitable.
<Michael (37:16)>:
Maybe it would become profitable if it either doubled TVL let's say, or was to
half its costs.
<Jason Kam (37:23)>:
Yep. And it's fair to assume that after you have sort of started breaking even,
then the additional fees that come to the Treasury will be sort of aggressively
burned. Or that will be approval. OK.
<Michael (37:37)>:
I think so. mean, yeah, it's up to the DAO really. mean, like there's, there's,
differences of opinions on these things. One way is to burn. So you just give,
that's one way to give value back to token holders is to just pure, to do pure
burns. I mean, a lot of the best companies in the world that don't, don't give
value to shareholders that way. Right. If like Amazon had just been burning,
buying back and burning Amazon stock years ago, that probably wouldn't be Amazon
today. Right. So they've, they've, buy back and grow. So.
<Michael (38:06)>:
There are opportunities to do that, I would say, with protocols. So you can, you
don't always have to burn, but certainly that will be on the table and up to the
DAO.
<Jason Kam (38:12)>:
Yeah. Tell me more about Euler Swap and Euler Earn, the timeline of those
things, like what they can do to the protocol in terms of revenue and the
product itself.
<Michael (38:24)>:
Yeah, so EulerSwap is a DEX that's built on top of Euler. It's been coming for
some time. We've been building it for many years, in fact. But yeah, it's
heavily dependent on the base Euler lending protocol working well, first and
foremost. And I'd say I don't want to give too much away on this call, but.
<Jason Kam (38:47)>:
<Michael (38:49)>:
What it does is it allows people to turn their accounts on Euler. So somebody
with an ordinary lending and borrowing account allows them to turn those
individual accounts into essentially a discrete AMM. And the AMM itself then
allows swapping to take place against the account. And uniquely, this provides a
way for people to provide just-in-time liquidity for swaps. And we think...
The mechanism here essentially allows somebody with, let's say, a professional
market maker with, let's say, one million dollars margin collateral in Euler
could facilitate the same depth of liquidity that you would get on, let's say, a
40 to 50 million dollar curve pool or Uniswap pool. So you see remarkable
increases in capital efficiency. The other big gain I would say is that the way
the swap accounts work
<Michael (39:48)>:
they take advantage of the cross-collateralization of Euler markets, you know,
on more for things for only pairs, fluid that, you know, deal with pairs. On
Aave and Euler, we have cross-collateralized markets. That means that a USDC
pool on Euler that's cross-collateralized, that we have one in a market called
Euler Yield, where it's essentially USDC that's cross-collateralized against 10
plus other stablecoin type assets.
<Michael (40:15)>:
Essentially people will be able to build AMMs that function a little bit like
say a curve 10 pool or something, you know, if people are familiar with a curve
three pool where they connect like USDC, USDT and die, imagine that but for, but
for curve yeah, 10 pools or whatever, all built on top of the Euler and yield
market. So yeah, it's a, there's, there's no decks out there that's quite like
it today. It's extremely novel. I'd say the closest thing is probably Fluid
<Jason Kam (40:22)>:
Yeah.
<Michael (40:44)>:
people be familiar with the success they've had. On Fluid, they came up with
this concept where people's collateral and debt could be used to swap liquidity.
So for instance, you had USDT debt and I had USDT and wanted USDC, I would send
the USDT to you, repay your debt, and then I would borrow on your behalf some
USDC and send that back to myself.
<Michael (41:11)>:
And that's how liquidity inside lending markets can operate as just-in-time
liquidity for swappers, essentially. yeah, Euler uses relies on a similar
principle there, but it operates in quite a different way, I'd say, overall to
Fluid.
<Jason Kam (41:30)>:
I suppose if it operates in similar ways and because of the TVL there can start
generating swap fees effectively. Do you expect most of the volume to come
through aggregators or would you sort of push a lot of effort to the front end
and the marketing group?
<Michael (41:48)>:
100 % through aggregators, I think. I mean, we will probably ship a front end
for this, I think they were very, yeah, it's very hard to compete by providing a
bespoke, unique front end experience. A lot of the volumes on swaps generally
goes through aggregators these days. So we've been working really closely with a
lot of the major solvers and a lot of the big aggregators out there. We've also
been working with another large
<Michael (42:17)>:
well-known DEX and collaborating with them on something. yeah, our go-to-market
here is dependent on people not even knowing that they're effectively not even
knowing that they're routing trades through what we're calling Euler swaps. It
will mostly be aggregator flows. And one thing it does is it not only generates
fees for the swappers but.
<Michael (42:42)>:
It also increases the borrowing demand on markets. so in some ways drives up the
capital efficiency of the underlying lending markets because the borrowed demand
will be higher, meaning obviously higher yields for lenders. Yeah.
<Jason Kam (42:46)>:
Yep.
Interesting.
<Jason Kam (42:59)>:
Heuristically, on the same bill in TVL, let's assume there's no additional TVL
that came through this. Obviously, there's dependency on how active people are
swapping for you. Heuristically, how should we think about this effort bringing
to the impacting of revenue? I mean, it should be higher, but is there a scale
that would make you satisfied?
<Michael (43:23)>:
Honestly, no, think I don't know how much other teams think about this, but what
we think of as the primary objective is growth and flows. I, yeah, I'm sort of
anti-fee. think Euler's barely, you know, nowhere close to being even a year old
now. And I think my, my emphasis would be on growth and flows and user activity.
the main metrics we care about, I would say is.
<Jason Kam (43:37)>:
Mm-.
<Jason Kam (43:42)>:
interesting.
<Michael (43:51)>:
Are, do we have users that really like, do we have loyal users? Do we have
sticky liquidity? Do the vault curators come and make things that are meaningful
or are they just creating markets that are kind of transient? They exist for
people to leap for little bit and then disappear. Like we don't want any of
that. want the, the, the KPIs here are real users. Once you, once you capture
flows and real users, then you can think about like revenues later. So it's not
the main.
<Jason Kam (43:56)>:
.
<Michael (44:18)>:
I wouldn't say it's the main objective for us is to focus on revenues, but
naturally I would expect there will be an increase in revenues if it's
successful. It's very new, so we don't know, but hopefully it's successful and
that will naturally lead to growth and revenue growth.
<Jason Kam (44:25)>:
Got it so so Yeah
<Jason Kam (44:34)>:
So I guess, as opposed to the 0.1%, 50 bits, 1%, 3 % fee of Uniswap, one, it
seems like you will not have additional fee on the swaps. You will not charge
0.35%. And secondly, is it fair to say that the fees that you charge, as if
Uniswap would charge one, it will be significantly lower in day one?
<Michael (45:01)>:
I would, mean, ultimately it will be up to the LPs themselves, you know, the
people running these swap accounts, what kind of fees they're setting. There
won't be any protocol fee on by default, you know, similar to Uniswap. So it'll
be up to them and that they will have to find a balance and figure out what
works. It's a little bit unknown, frankly, how, what swap fee they should set on
this because they haven't, as an LP here, on the one hand you have, we have
much...
<Jason Kam (45:09)>:
Mmm... Mmm...
I see, that's cool.
<Michael (45:29)>:
lower capital requirements for LPing and other other DEXs. know, Euler Swap will
be instantly liquid on day one, as long as we have a handful of people running
swap accounts. It's not like we need to do massive liquidity mining campaigns or
anything, or like private deals to bring in huge amounts of LP capital like
you'd see on other DEXs. Because there's already TVL in Euler that can be can be
used, right? There's liquidity there that can be can be utilized.
<Jason Kam (45:43)>:
that's cool.
Because they're just TVLs already.
<Michael (45:58)>:
And, but yeah, then it's up to people to kind of balance the costs of running
these accounts and they're not cost free to run. There's all sorts of things
like permanent loss and like borrowing costs and things that they have to factor
in additional risk perhaps on the new protocol and so on. So we'll see what they
create. I think that EulerDAO should maybe run itself some swap accounts,
perhaps even at a loss as a kind of loss leader.
<Jason Kam (46:12)>:
Mmm. Interesting.
<Michael (46:26)>:
to stimulate growth. But yeah, that's on my view.
<Jason Kam (46:29)>:
But I guess, yeah, sorry to cut you off. Basically, on the fees that they set,
you would not be taking a part of it. Like, it will be a zero-tick rate
business. And for a while, I guess how it benefits you would just be more TVL,
potentially, if people like this, or increased solidization, driving more tick
rate through the back end.
<Michael (46:50)>:
Yeah, exactly. Exactly. I mean, there will be a fee, will be a fee switch and
there'll be more about that. I think when, when some of the collaborations we've
got become apparent, like more to say about that. but, but yeah, the fee switch,
I would say the, the, the initial driver's say, you know, if you imagine, you
said, you just never, you said there's no fee on this thing, no fee whatsoever.
Then effectively all the money would go to the LPs, right.
<Jason Kam (47:01)>:
Gotcha.
<Michael (47:18)>:
then the LPs will be the ones in competition. So how would they better compete?
They'd probably try to lower their fees. And as they lower their fees, that
drives more swap volume through them, which then brings more volumes and flow
through the lending protocol, which should bring on board more TVL, which in
principle then should mean that the benefits of swapping through Euler are even
higher because there's deeper liquidity, which then should mean more swap
volume. so there's a potential here for quite a strong positive feedback leap, I
would say, given the capital efficiency.
<Michael (47:47)>:
gain, potential gains of capital efficiency. But it's all of them needs to be
seen.
<Jason Kam (47:50)>:
And Yeah, and what's the timing on this?
<Michael (47:57)>:
well, it's, it's, it's, it's going into audit. yeah. as we speak, it's already
had a couple of audits. It's been, yeah, a couple of changes we've had to, make
not because of audits, just because, yeah, I've go to market plans. which yeah,
again, will be become more obvious as we, as we launch, but I, I'm, we're not
talking sort of months and months. think we're, yeah, maybe weeks or months or
maybe another month or so.
<Jason Kam (48:11)>:
.
<Jason Kam (48:15)>:
Got it.
<Jason Kam (48:27)>:
I think that's as much as I can get from you on this call. And I guess this will
be a pretty market maker heavy effort. Any LPs would have to deal with both the
IP as well as any swap that occurs. They're effectively being forced to borrow
or lend, if I'm not mistaken. So it seems like a complex formula if you're
managing a lot of positions.
<Michael (48:29)>:
Yep.
<Jason Kam (48:53)>:
I guess, is that right? market makers mostly dealing with this? And secondly, I
guess the BDF for there is you and your team actively talking to the winter
means of the world. Is that fair to say? OK. OK.
<Michael (49:04)>:
Yeah, I think that's fair to say. When does this go live? Like it's live now,
isn't it? But yeah, there's, I don't know, there's some things that... Okay.
<Jason Kam (49:10)>:
Well, it's only live to members. And I guess you can pick an embargo time.
<Michael (49:16)>:
I went and pick an embargo time, maybe give it a couple of days. I think we're
going to a couple of, yeah, 17th. I think we'll, we'll have a, yeah, an
announcement there to make about some of the market, a market maker that you
might have mentioned. Um, yeah. So yeah, we'll be, , well, we will, yeah, I
mean, as you said, it's, it's not for, this is not a retail LP product. wouldn't
say this is not for, for people to come in a couple days.
<Jason Kam (49:23)>:
Okay, we could do that. We could do that.
okay. Interesting.
<Michael (49:46)>:
not understand what they're doing. It's definitely a sophisticated,
sophisticated tool and people need, will need to understand the risks and
fortunately they have, they have the ability to adjust the fees, right? To, to,
to hopefully factor in these costs. And so there will probably be some
experimentation as they work out how much does it cost me on aggregate across
all the different costs I might face to run these things. And I want to position
my fee accordingly. And hopefully that fee is still leaves.
<Michael (50:12)>:
a lot on the table and then that makes it competitive in the market. If
ultimately the costs weren't too high, then it will have failed as a product, I
suppose. But we're hopeful that won't be the case.
Yeah. Do you have a, I mean, this is the cooler part of the thesis. How would
you define success by your end if this worked? You know, like, I guess, is there
a benchmark in your mind that you want this protocol to get to? Like, boy, if
the swap had worked and then the flywheel really started spinning, like going
from 1 billion to X would make me happy.
<Michael (50:51)>:
I think, yeah, think if the, just purely on the swap, I think it's about market
share. So I'd like to see it doing similar, having a similar impact to Fluid on
the market share of Dex's. I mean, yeah, hats off to that team because they've
done exceptionally well and managed to take market share in a very, very
difficult market to take market share from people. It's been, yeah.
<Jason Kam (51:17)>:
Yeah. And what would that mean for the TVL if you get there? Sorry to cut you
off.
<Michael (51:23)>:
Yeah, I mean, in purely TVL terms, maybe double doubling or tripling the, the,
markets on which these accounts run. So that wouldn't be, that wouldn't be total
TVL I would guess I'd like, yeah, it could, it's very, very hard to, hard for us
to say. So we're not trying to set, you know, we're not trying to set the
expectations too high on our side. And so we see it's just such a novel, like
experiment, I suppose, but
<Michael (51:52)>:
My guess is it could really have quite a big impact if you turn a single USDC
pool into now the main go-to place where people are swapping and lending and
borrowing. It could be significant, but it could, yeah, it's unpredictable. It's
hard for us to do tests on this thing. So we've had a few people trying to.
<Jason Kam (52:04)>:
Swap is huge. Yeah.
<Michael (52:20)>:
run small tests in production, until you go live and really see how well it's,
how well it's, it picks up volume, I would say, yeah, the, it's a little more
gas expensive than other exchanges. And how, how, how important is that these
days? I mean, it used to be the be all and end all when we first started
building a DEX we're like, how do we get swaps down below a hundred K gas?
Because yeah, that it's the main, the main competitive edge you would have.
<Michael (52:47)>:
These days, I don't know if that's necessarily true, especially as we move more
liquidity to L2s. It's less important there. Even on main net, gas costs have
come down dramatically and that gas costs just a fixed absolute cost on every
swap, right? So if that's smaller, then the capital efficiency and the fee start
to weigh more heavily on the swap volume you get.
<Jason Kam (53:11)>:
Are you going to Solana anytime soon? Sticking with you, yeah, OK. So we talked
about the swap. Is there anything else that really excites you on the horizon in
the next three or six months?
<Michael (53:14)>:
enough.Yeah.
<Michael (53:28)>:
So we've got Euler-Earn coming, which works a little bit similar to the way
that, well, it's essentially like Euler's version of metamorpho. I think these
kind of models are quite important actually for the way things work. for
comparison, on morpho you have individual markets or individual pairs
essentially. then, you might, means you might have, I think as they do like 50
or 60 plus different USDC.
markets where you can borrow USDC. Now, obviously alone, that's very capital
efficient, but the key insight, I guess, with Morpho is that you could have an
aggregator that sits above that and rather than people depositing liquidity into
individually each of the 60 markets, they have somebody like a Gortner or a
Stakehouse or whoever that essentially manages this asset map.
aggregator asset management vault at the top and retail LPs into the asset
management vault. And then the asset manager allocates capital to these lower
level markets. And that helps reduce the capital inefficiency of pairs. So it's
quite important. I think it also helps the velocity of capital and finding a
place where it's needed in a
<Michael (54:52)>:
time efficient manner. If you just run the pairs, then technically the free
market, if some new market comes up where there's clearly demand to borrow USDC,
technically the market should find that. But I think historically we saw that
didn't happen. There was a protocol years ago called CASHI that was almost
identical to Morpho Blue in many ways. It had reactive interest rates and it was
permissional pairs, immutable permissionless pairs, very, very similar at its
core.
<Jason Kam (55:13)>:
Ugh.
<Michael (55:21)>:
it didn't do very well and that's because there was no capital allocation layer,
there was no asset management layer above on which, you know, where capital
could find new opportunities more efficiently. I think that's why those types of
vaults work well. Euler currently doesn't have those because it's still, we've
had a lot of the innovation on more of that base layer, whereas, you know, we've
said instead of pairs, we have more capital efficient sort of clusters of
markets.
<Michael (55:51)>:
But still there are, you know, there are still obvious opportunities for growth
there. So Euler & Earn is an asset management layer that can sits on top of all
the different lower level markets on Euler. And it works quite similarly to
Metamorpho. One of the main innovations though is that we've decided to make it
more of a free market model on, you know, Metamorpho is a little bit
protectionist, if you would. It sort of only allows you to deploy into Morpho
Vault.
<Jason Kam (56:03)>:
Yeah.
<Michael (56:21)>:
and so, the Euler earned product will allow you to allocate to Euler or God
forbid Morpho or Maker or, know, or whoever really. And, yeah, exactly. Yeah. So
we, we, might end up helping some, you know, caps to go to other, other
competitors, but at the same time, it's more useful product and it should be
strictly better because in the worst case scenario, you could just have all the
set, you know,
<Jason Kam (56:30)>:
It's cool. No curse. You just get more users on your platform. That's cool.
<Michael (56:48)>:
It could exactly match like the asset management, like going into the Morpho
Vaults. But if there is, does happen to be a better opportunity today on, on
Euler or Maker, then you could also allocate to that. So yeah.
<Jason Kam (56:55)>:
Yeah, that's cool.
<Jason Kam (57:01)>:
I might have some interest for you because I think a lot of these, there are
these credit card companies or crypto native debit cards that are popping up and
they're occurring TVL. Those TVL are spendable. They just spend with card and
they almost invariably deposit those TVL into say Morpho to like earn yield.
Yours seems like a better way to deploy USDC and USDT in that regards. Just like
we'll touch base on the offline.
<Michael (57:27)>:
Yeah, hopefully. Yeah, sounds great.
<Jason Kam (57:31)>:
Any questions from the group? Give it three seconds. I don't think so. Michael,
thank you so much for your time. This is really helpful.
<Michael (57:44)>:
Yeah, thank you very much. Yeah, it's been great to chat. Happy to answer any
more questions offline. People feel free to reach out, get in touch with me if
they have any. Great, thanks.
<Jason Kam (57:53)>:
Perfect. Thanks guys.
VIDEO 